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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 18-1231 
____________ 
 
JAVED IQBAL, 
    Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
    Respondent  
 __________________________________ 
 
On a Petition For Review of an Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A029-120-853) 
Immigration Judge: Leo F. Finston 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 21, 2018 
 
Before: JORDAN, RESTREPO and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed May 22, 2018) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
__________________________ 
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P.5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent.  
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Javed Iqbal (“Iqbal”) petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 
decision denying his motion to reopen.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the 
petition for review. 
 Iqbal, a native of Pakistan and lawful permanent resident of the United States, 
pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
to providing material support to a Foreign Terrorist Organization, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) and § 2, in connection with having provided technical services and 
equipment to al-Manar, a Hezbollah-run television station in Beirut.  He was sentenced to 
a term of imprisonment of 69 months.  The Department of Homeland Security 
commenced removal proceedings, charging that Iqbal was removable under 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(4)(B), for having engaged in terrorist activity as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(3)(B)(iii).  A removal charge based on 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(cc) was 
then added.  Iqbal applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). 
 On March 20, 2014, the Immigration Judge found Iqbal removable as charged, and 
concluded that he was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal because he had 
provided material support to Hezbollah.1  Iqbal then retained counsel and appealed to the 
Board of Immigration Appeals, contending that he was denied an opportunity to consult 
with an attorney and did not understand the removal proceedings.  On October 9, 2014, 
                                              
1 Section § 1229b(c)(4) of title 8 disqualifies from cancellation of removal an alien who 
is inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3), which in turn bars from admission an alien 
who provided material support to a terrorist organization, see 8 U.S.C. §  
1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI). 
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the Board affirmed the IJ and denied Iqbal’s appeal.  He did not petition for review of the 
Board’s October 9, 2014 decision.  Iqbal was released from prison on May 21, 2015. 
 On August 16, 2017, Iqbal filed a counselled motion to reopen with the Board, in 
order to apply for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture.2  He 
claimed in the motion that he was attacked during a 2005 visit to Pakistan by armed 
members of “an extremist Islamic party.”  He alleged that they were angry with him for 
doing work for a local political party.  He stated that he did not raise the incident during 
his removal proceedings because it did not occur to him that he could claim asylum based 
on the action of “thugs.”  Iqbal further claimed that, after he was released from prison in 
May, 2015, his cousin who lives in Pakistan informed him that the same local Muslim 
extremist party learned that he would be returning to Pakistan and threatened to kill him 
“for his past treachery.”  In support, Iqbal submitted an affidavit from his cousin, Bashir 
Ahmed, in which he stated, among other things, that the Muslim extremist party was 
“connected” to the local police; and a police report concerning the 2005 incident.  Iqbal 
additionally asked the Board to reopen removal proceedings under its sua sponte 
authority based on his family ties to the United States and his medical problems.   
 On December 20, 2017, the Board denied the motion to reopen as untimely filed 
under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and further held that no exception to the 90-day time limit 
applied.  The Board noted that, to the extent that Iqbal’s motion was premised on events 
                                              
2 The material support bar prevents an alien from receiving asylum and withholding of 
removal, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(v), 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I), 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv), 8 
C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2), but does not prevent an alien from qualifying for deferral of 
removal under the CAT, see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a); Matter of M-H-Z-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 
757, 764 n.7 (BIA 2016). 
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that occurred in 2005, his concerns could have been raised at his March, 2014 removal 
hearing.  The Board rejected Iqbal’s assertion that his lack of legal representation 
prevented him from presenting his CAT claim, because the IJ specifically advised him of 
his right to apply for CAT protection.  In the alternative, the Board concluded that Iqbal’s 
motion failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for CAT protection, reasoning that 
the allegations regarding the 2015 threat were based on secondhand information from 
unnamed individuals.  Moreover, the police report which Iqbal submitted showing that 
Pakistani police investigated the 2005 attack by the same group, refuted his cousin’s 
assertion that the local police colluded with the extremists.  Thus, Iqbal failed to show 
that he would likely be tortured “by or at the instigation of or with the acquiescence of a 
public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).  
The Board further determined in its discretion that Iqbal did not show that sua sponte 
reopening was warranted. 
 Iqbal has petitioned for review.  We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), 
(b)(1).  “A motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a 
hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other 
evidentiary material.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).  Ordinarily, “a party may file only one 
motion to reopen . . . and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on 
which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be 
reopened.”  Id. at § 1003.2(c)(2).  The time and number limitations in § 1003.2(c) apply 
to motions to reopen to seek protection under the CAT, including those based on changed 
country conditions.  Bamaca-Cifuentes v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 870 F.3d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 
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2017).  The Board may deny a timely motion to reopen if the alien has not established a 
prima facie case for the relief sought; the alien has not introduced previously unavailable, 
material evidence; or in the case of discretionary relief, even if these requirements are 
met, the alien would not be entitled to a favorable exercise of discretion.  Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv. v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1988).  We treat the agency’s 
findings of fact as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to 
conclude to the contrary.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. 
v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992).  See also Shardar v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 
503 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2007) (when Board denies motion to reopen on ground that 
applicant has failed to make prima facie showing, Court’s review is to ensure that 
decision is supported by substantial evidence and is not an abuse of discretion) (citing 
Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
 Iqbal’s motion to reopen was filed well beyond the 90-day deadline and the Board 
thus properly denied it on that basis.  The 90-day deadline does not apply where the alien 
applies for CAT protection “based on changed circumstances arising  . . . in the country 
to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available 
and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”  8 C.F.R. § 
1003(c)(3)(ii).  The Board correctly concluded that Iqbal’s allegation that he was attacked 
in 2005 during a trip to Pakistan could have been presented at his 2014 removal hearing.  
Iqbal’s brief focuses on the alleged 2015 threat, Petitioner’s Informal Brief, at 2-3, but 
the alleged 2015 threat is insufficient to show worsening country condition that would 
excuse Iqbal’s untimely motion to reopen.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).   
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 In any event, regarding the alleged 2015 threat, no record evidence compels 
reversal of the Board’s determination that Iqbal failed to demonstrate prima facie 
eligibility for CAT protection.  An applicant seeking CAT protection bears the 
burden of establishing that he would “more likely than not” be targeted for torture, 
“at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity.”  8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.17(a), 1208.18(a)(1).  The 
allegations regarding the 2015 threat against Iqbal were too attenuated to demonstrate 
prima facie eligibility for relief, and, as the Board noted, Iqbal’s own evidence in the 
form of a police report refutes the allegation that the extremist group is allied with the 
local police. 
 Last, although the Board has the authority to reopen proceedings sua sponte, 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.23(a), its decision not to exercise its discretion is unreviewable, except in 
certain limited circumstances not present here.  See Sang Goo Park v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 
846 F.3d 645, 650-51 (3d Cir. 2017); Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d 
Cir. 2003).  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.  
